Nuclear threshold states''*those that have chosen nuclear restraint despite having significant nuclear capabilities*seem like the perfect partners for the reinvigorated drive toward global nuclear disarmament. Having chosen nuclear restraint, threshold states may embrace disarmament as a way to guarantee the viability of their choice (which may be impossible in a proliferating world). Supporting disarmament efforts affirms their restraint, both self-congratulating and self-fulfilling. Additionally, the commitment to their non-nuclear status springs at least in part from a moral stance against nuclear weapons that lends itself to energetic support of global disarmament. However, threshold states also offer significant challenges to the movement for nuclear weapons elimination, in particular in relation to acquisition of enrichment and reprocessing facilities. This article analyzes both the challenges and opportunities posed by threshold states by examining the cases of Brazil and Japan.
The global drive for disarmament, reinvigorated by President Barack Obama's Prague speech, now seems more hopeful than at any time over the past several decades. This article seeks to analyze both the promise and challenges to the disarmament campaign offered by the nuclear threshold states*that is, states that have chosen nuclear restraint despite having significant nuclear capacity. 1 On the one hand, having made the political decision to stay non-nuclear, threshold states may embrace the disarmament initiative as a way to ensure the continued viability of their choice (which may not be possible in a proliferating world). Supporting disarmament efforts could be seen as an affirmation of their restraint, both selfcongratulating and self-fulfilling. Additionally, the commitment to their non-nuclear status springs at least in part from a moral stance against nuclear weapons, which would lend itself to energetic support of global disarmament. On the other hand, disarmament initiatives could be seen as stripping the threshold states of their virtual nuclear capability, constraining their future choices. In addition, many of these states have large investments in the nuclear fuel cycle. Because global disarmament efforts may eventually seek to lock down even the civilian fuel cycle, they could be seen as a direct economic and energy threat by the threshold states. 2 Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, March 2010 RUBLEE, Maria Rost. The nuclear threshold states: challenges and opportunities. Nonproliferation Review, Monterey, v. 17, n. 1, p. 49-70, mar. 2010 . 
